Sociology of HIV/AIDS Embodiment: Epistemological Encounter- Emotion with the Social Space

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Abstract: How do we know what we know? From Sociological perspective has a simple response that: We have learned it. Since our childhood, we have learned to relate to the world through categories that our social environment readily supplied for us (Durkheim 2001; Durkheim and Mauss 1963; Martin 2000). Our sense of time, of Body, of space, of emotion or of the sacred—all of this came mediated by the people and institutions that surround us. It formed our judgment and shaped our social space, our morality and emotion. Our bodies were also trained in the process, too. We came to recognize and experience certain physical sensations, to move and use our limbs in this or that manner, and know when to feel disgust and revulsion (Mauss 2006; Elias 2000). The things that feel natural to us are not natural at all. These clashes are exposed daily in the small and large symbolic struggles that pervade life in society (Bourdieu 1987; Lamont 1992), and reveal the one meta-rule that governs it all: body politics. This paper examines whether the theoretical position and ambitions of sociologists of the body are increasingly making obstructive and irrelevant the subject boundaries and methodological conventions through the epistemological queries associated with their parent discipline. These imply that it is necessary to reject the dominant problematic of sociology and utilize non-disciplinary resources if we are to understand issues surrounding the ‘lived experience’ of embodiment from PLWH. In opposing this rejection of sociology, if not the use of other intellectual resources, I argue that the discipline contains much valuable theorising about experience which has yet to be developed by body theorists.

Abstract: Sociology of Embodiment, PLWH, Epistemological encounter, emotion, Social space.

I. INTRODUCTION

Yet sociology was also borne of concerns that pushed toward a widening of the scope of modern social thought. Max Weber realized that modern society’s privileged ‘rational action’ was circumscribed in time and space and Simmel drew attention to the new ‘sensorial experiences’ of modern urban life. Karl Marx—who as Stuart Hall has astutely argued, was responsible for bestowing a new historicity upon the (Enlightenment) subject—can be recognized as perceiving the corporeal dimensions of social relations, evident in his treatment of working-class life, labor and alienation, that is, of how ‘capital’ imposed its punishments on the flesh and blood, embodied existence of the working classes. Although Durkheim may seem to have had little to say regarding the embodied character of ‘social facts’, his sociological imagination, fired by perceptions of the different relations that ‘tribal’ and modern societies had to the emotional and the symbolic, led him devote attention to embodied forms of emotional expression among ‘tribal’ societies, which he understood as social and collective forms of constructing and asserting bonds of belonging. And to Marcel Mauss, deeply influenced by Durkheim, we owe a major classical contribution. His essay on the ‘techniques of the body’ posits a clear recognition of the forms through which different cultures and societies make use of the body, molding and ‘educating’ it in ways that become fundamental to social relations. Although Mauss did not go beyond dualist conceptions insofar as he conceived of the body as ‘man’s [sic] first instrument’ or ‘technical object’, he did nonetheless draw attention to the complexity of the ‘techniques of the body’ that particular societies develop, paying heed to the way societies inculcate different embodied abilities and dexterities along the lines of what today we study as gendered constructions. Thus, girls become ‘girls’—and later ‘women’—as they are taught their culture’s embodied prescriptions; boys are taught how to be boys who then become men with culturally appropriate embodied demeanor and skills. In the mid-twentieth century, an outstanding contribution to understanding the corporeal nature of social relations was made by Norbert Elias. His landmark work of historical sociology, The Civilizing Process, published initially in 1939, stands out for its emphasis on social and political processes that unfold through and upon the body. With his view of the genesis of modern forms of regulation of postures, gestures, demeanor, actions and emotions, he anticipated Foucault’s theory of a disciplining ‘biopower’. Contemporary sociology has moved considerably forward in ‘bringing the body back in’. Kevin White (1995: 188) points to changes in twentieth-century social life that to his mind have stimulated the sociological imagination to look at the body: ‘The aging structure in late capitalist societies and the declining death rate in Third World countries had literally made the number of bodies problematic. The body as a consumer of commodities and lifestyles has highlighted the social shaping of the body, and developments in medical technology—around body parts—has problematized what were once taken-for-granted events, namely death and the inviolability of organs within the human organism.’ New sensibilities blossomed in the postwar period and came to a head in the ‘turbulent sixties’, urging critical disengagement from the Cartesian rationalism that had been so deeply rooted in modernism. As Sally Banes (1993) has demonstrated, the performative counter-cultural politics of art and youth revolt placed...
the disciplined, domesticated, ‘repressed’ body of bourgeois culture at the center of all it sought to reject, transcend and transform. Embodied politics fed, directly and indirectly, into the efforts made by scholarly work and toward a veritable revolution in the humanities and social sciences, bringing about new understandings of power, daily life and social change. Thus, in the latter decades of the twentieth century, a field of research that we can refer to as the ‘sociology of the body’ emerged. Yet studies on the body – and the empirical reality of bodies themselves – have presented a challenge to knowledge boundaries, drawing insights from a wide range of disciplines that provide diverse angles of approach to corporeal practices and power relations. Not surprisingly then, while this new field has often manifested close kinship to post-structuralist perspectives that emphasize ‘discursivity’ – how social practices are borne of and develop in relation to cultural discourse – there has also been a certain possibility for tension between this ‘cultural turn’ and a more classical sociological approach demanding a concern for bodies that foregrounds their shaping through the material and institutional dimensions of particular forms of social relations. This article discusses some of the theoretical and historical processes which break through an initial philosophical silencing of bodies and embodiment and then focuses on contemporary developments, placing emphasis on the rich and diverse types of rethinking that have been encouraged and the complex, dynamic research agenda that has followed. We also devote attention to some particularly significant interfaces with ‘subfields’ such as the sociology of medicine and health, sex and gender, sport and leisure and sexuality. Furthermore, although contemporary perspectives are still mineled in the struggle to break with the ‘Eurocentrism’ of classical disciplines, it is important to keep in mind that the very mind/body split that so deeply shaped Western thought may be much less decisive or omnipresent in the social thought of ‘the South’. Feminist and post-colonial theories have emphasized the ideological link between the suppression of bodily experience and Western construction of its ‘Others’. Sociologies of the global South (Connell, 2007) may offer unique theoretical and methodological contributions to build upon.

II. FROM THEORETICAL CONCERNS

Louis Dumont and Norbert Elias provide a fruitful starting point for our understanding of the historical processes that give birth to modern individualist cultures and the knowledge systems they have produced. Initially, such cultures not only built up an artificial ‘mind/body’ split but constructed the body as a bounded container separating (and protecting) ‘individuals’ from one another (Bordo, 1987). Personhood, when defined from this perspective, denoted or attempted to focus on that which supposedly separated the human so distinctly from other species (a prime concern of Enlightenment and evolutionist thought) or from pre-modern (or ‘non-Western’) sexual, sensual cultures. Furthermore, a critical look at the historical processes giving birth to the Western notion of body and its concomitant philosophical legacy of mind/body separation (as, of course, most paradigmatically expressed by Descartes) shows how this legacy continues, both in overt and covert forms, to impact on the way we live today. Norbert Elias pointed clearly to the fact that the disciplining and controlling of one’s own body and impulses – an ethic of bourgeois self-discipline – could be seen as inextricably linked to the way power was exercised over the (minds and) bodies of others and, most importantly, how this new modern form of discipline, in the context of modern ‘democratizing’ society, relied much more on the development of internal forms of policing and self control than on overt (and/or violent) forms of external coercion. Brazilian thinker Gilberto Freyre (1998 [1933]) showed how, on the margins of Western world, the process of colonization made control over virtually everybody’s body the prerogative of the ‘master’. Freyre’s research on plantation sociability, first published in 1933, managed to bring in phenomena such as menstruation, eating and perspiration, thus suggesting a social science that would be able to capture the crucial (and bodily) minutiae of everyday life. Bringing together theoretical insights derived from Norbert Elias (1982), Mikhail Bakhtin (1970) and Michel Foucault (1963, 1976, 1984a, 1984b), Bryant S Turner (2008: 39) points out that ‘The transition from the Renaissance to the modern world thus involves a transition from the “open body” linked to the public world through ritual and carnival to the “closed body” of individualized consumer society.’ He provides a compelling argument for a sociology of the body that is ‘not sociobiology or socio physiology. It is not reductionism, although it is genuinely and literally a materialist analysis. ... [It] is the study of the problem of social order and it can be organized around four issues. These are the reproduction and regulation of populations in time and space, and the restraint and representation of the body as a vehicle of the self’ (Turner, 2008: 42).

He recognizes that, in modern discourse and culture, the body has been a dichotomously gendered one and ‘the sociology of the body’ is also an ‘analysis of how certain cultural polarities are politically enforced through the institutions of sex, family and patriarchy’ (Turner, 2008: 42).David Le Breton makes a strong case for the need to break with dichotomous forms of thinking that have relegated the body to something lesser than (rational) ‘humaneness’. He argues that ‘Without a body to give him a face, man is nothing. In living , the world is continually reduced to his body, through the symbols that it embodies. Man’s [sic] existence is embodied’ (2002: 7; our translation).Modern feminist theory, from its earliest engagements with psychoanalysis and phenomenology, has been dedicated to the deconstruction of Enlightenment myths based on the notion of embodied, sexual, emotional females, occupying a position of notably inferiority vis-a-vis the ‘rational’ male, who is graced by an inherently greater ability to control impulse, desire and other human beings. Contemporary feminist theorists have reconstructed a perspective that considers all human beings as simultaneously rational, emotional and embodied subjects. This argument originated perhaps with Simone de Beauvoir’s (1949) pioneering work and its thesis that modern culture and society had characteristically associated women with the body. She wrote that while woman ‘becomes the body’ and ‘the sex’ in which she is (seen as) imprisoned, ‘man’ chooses to forget that his anatomy also has hormones and testicles; he takes on a disembodied, transcendental essence best signified by reason (de Beauvoir, 2010 [1949]: 12) De Beauvoir’s work inspired ‘second wave’ feminist scholars such as Germaine Greer (2001), Gayle Rubin (2006) and Susan Brownmiller (1984), who argued that the social organization of relations between women and men constituted a sui generis form of power unfolding through historical forms of male control over, and shaping of women’s bodies. ‘What is a domesticated woman? A female of the species. A woman is a
woman. She only becomes a domestic, a wife, a chattel, a playboy bunny, a prostitute or a human dictaphone in certain relations. What then are these relations?’, queried Rubin (2006: 87–88). Brownmiller’s book Femininity (1984), identifying femininity as ‘a nostalgic tradition of imposed limitations’, was organized into chapters such as ‘Body’, ‘Hair’, ‘Clothes’, ‘Voice’, ‘Skin’ and ‘Movement’, representing different dimensions of the cultural construction of limitation, since as she put it ‘biological femaleness is not enough’ (1984: 15). Femininity implies learning restrictions: bodily, behavioral, emotional and cognitive (Kehl, 1998). Contemporary feminist theorizing on gender, self and body has unfolded through intense and enriching dialogue with Foucauldian theory and, in particular, with Foucault’s notion of ‘biopower’. Italian theorist and semiotician Teresa de Lauretis (1987), for example, provides an astute reworking of the Foucauldian concept of ‘technologies of the self’ and argues for its gendered dimension, that is, technologies which act upon an embodied subject, producing subjects who are women and men (who should therefore perform in correspondingly feminine and masculine ways). These embodied ways of being seem most frequently to correspond to hegemonic norms, yet pose the question of how and to what extent, while also raising the issue of the possibility/probability of forms of transgression or contestation. Over the course of several decades, a plethora of feminist texts on gender, culture and bodies has come into being, ranging from more theoretical attempts – such as that of de Lauretis – to understand normative and transgressive constructions of female bodies, to works providing empirical inquiries into such phenomena. One of the many excellent works of this sort in the English language is the edited volume Writing on the Body (Conboy et al., 1997), which brings together a series of landmark texts penned by noted feminist theorists such as Emily Martin, Susan Bordo, bell hooks and Sandra Lee Bartky. The field’s indebtedness to de Beauvoir’s classic and the urgency of carrying her challenge forward is emphasized in the editors’ introduction. As feminist authors and critical race theorists have insisted, in modern societies, bodies are simultaneously and continuously produced and constructed as both ‘raced’ and ‘gendered’. Historically speaking, both women and people marked as ‘racial others’ have been associated with the body (rather than with the ‘higher values’ of white, upper-class males’ ‘cultured rationality’) (see Said, 1978). Masculinity studies such as those produced by Australian theorist Raewyn Connell and North American Michael Kimmel shed light on the differently constructed HIV/AIDS bodies of males in terms of historical intersections of class, race and gender. During the 1990s, Ann Laura Stoler (1995) extended the Foucauldian history of sexuality to argue that the bourgeois Western sexual regime included specific gendered and racial mechanisms (controlling the racialized body/sex, to ensure symbolic and material superiority of whiteness); other feminist social theorists such as hooks and Collins have looked at how gender and race come together in constructing embodied subjectivities within the context of a historical legacy of oppressive social hierarchies. From a British perspective, Kobena Mercer (1994) deals among other things with racialized representations of bodies in art, media and culture, and George Yancey (2008) uses a phenomenological approach that probes the issue of the lived experience of body as it has been hegemonically defined by a binary scheme that attempts to place people into neat categories of embodied difference. The ‘power of the white gaze to make Black bodies inferior’ (Westmoreland, 2010: 112) and the power of the male gaze to define and objectify the female body are extremely powerful social forces that nonetheless tend to be naturalized in common societal schemes of perception, to the extent that, as hooks (1997) has argued regarding a film made by a popular Black male film director, many spectators seemed not to notice the reduction of a Black woman’s person to some of the crudest tropes of Western culture’s representations of those who are, in this sense, ‘doubly-othered’. Theoretical movements addressing the body have often drawn on literary or other not strictly-sociological sources. Thus, authors who write on race and the body derive ideas from contemporary fiction, say, the works of Black feminist writers such as Toni Morrison and Alice Walker. Discursive exchange and experimentation sometimes takes a new turn, as in the work of the Portuguese thinker Miguel Vale de Almeida. Almeida, known for his ethnographic work, wrote ‘O manifesto do corpo’ [The body manifesto] (2004) at the beginning of the millennium – a semi-literary treatise that uses the first person for imaginary subjects through whom sociological reflections on the body are produced. Another innovative approach that proposes new narratives and sensibilities to bodies is the work of Canadian scholar Arthur Frank (2000). Listening attentively to people’s memories of illness and informed by readings of symbolic interactionism, Althuser and Habermas, Frank transforms personal discourses of bodily experience and biographies into complex sociological insights. New themes include bringing ‘the marginal’ to center stage. Contemporary examples are studies that focus on ‘queer bodies’, drawing attention to the processes that construct particular bodies as abject, pathological or strange. Butler (1990, 1993, 2009) combines social interactionist methods with feminist and Foucauldian insights on the social processes that construct ‘intelligible’ (hetero)normatively embodied subjects and their corresponding ‘abject others’. Her work has stirred debate and become a fundamental reference throughout a wide range of disciplines, where she is frequently cited for her post-structuralist attention to the manner in which gender is hegemonically ‘performed’ in culturally intelligible ways that provide people with a social existence that is recognized or denied (Butler, 1990). In her second major work, Butler argues (1993: xi) ‘[W]e might suggest that bodies only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemes.’ Influenced also by Louis Althusser’s notion of the subject as constructed by and through ideology, her notion of embodied performances of gender moves forward from Simone de Beauvoir and earlier feminist discussions of femininity, gender, parody and masquerade: there are neither ‘originals’ nor ‘copies’ to be had, nor a pre-discursive, biological, binary ‘sex’ that serves as the basic substrate upon which a socio-cultural construct is built; there is, however, a naturalized, compulsory notion of dimorphic, heterosexual bodies which attempts to force all bodies to fit within its dichotomous framework. The work of contemporary queer theorists such as Judith/Jack Halberstam (2005) and Beatriz/Paul B Preciado (1994, 2008) brings into focus the lives of those who lie beyond the pale of (heteronormative) cultural intelligibility, and also helps us to move beyond the bias of the ‘minority studies’ of an earlier period in the history of our discipline. Preciado (2004) offers us the concept of ‘queer multitudes’ and Brazilian queer theorist/sociologist Richard Miskolcire affirms the potential of an ‘analytics of normalization’ (2009) that the sociological tradition promises and which this contemporary perspective brings to fruition. There is little in contemporary sociology which has not, to some extent, devoted attention to issues such as the intersection of class, race and gender and their embodied dimensions, or the theoretical issue of how the self is socially constructed as body, emotion and cognition. Thus, we see that major schools of sociologists engage in critical debate, their arguments must acknowledge
the embodied dimensions of social existence and social action. One good example of this methodological shift can be found by examining the tension that runs through the debate between followers of contemporary theorists Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens. While the Bourdieusian focus on the contemporary world has provided a rich analysis of *habitus* and the diverse types of ‘capital’ which reproduce different forms of domination, Giddens and his followers emphasize the unique ways in which modernity becomes reflexive and engages people as agents in processes of social change. For Bourdieu and his followers, the body is a prime site where social relations of power and domination are reproduced (as the embodiment of the habitus, through body ‘capitals’, etc.); for Giddens, it is part of the modern ‘reflexive project of the self’ – from its ‘plastic sexuality’ to therapies and surgeries, hobbies, fashions and bodily subcultures that are incorporated as identity, the ‘body projects’ built by subjects for whom they may simultaneously represent and produce pleasure and pain, alienation and resistance. In consonance with Giddens’ perspective, Cas Wouters’ *Informalization* (2007) suggests a reversal in the trend that Elias convincingly portrayed as a constitutive element in the genesis of modernity, that is, the movement ‘from detailed and stricter regimes of manners and emotions to other less formal and rigid regimes of manners and emotions’ (2007: 167) lived out in corporeal and attitudinal terms. Langman’s (2008; Braun and Langman, 2011) work on the phenomenon of *carnivalization*, providing insights into the deployment and construction of bodies within our current post-modern moment, may help to complete the picture. His approach combines the alienation theory of critical Frankfurtian lineage with Cultural Studies’ sensibilities to issues of identity, experience and how people struggle to build meaning in their lives. He advances the thesis that we may be currently witnessing a veritable carnivalization of culture and society, that is, that the boundaries which once kept the transgressive space of the carnival at a distance from everyday life have been imploded. Previously circumscribed carnivalesque attitudes and practices spill out into society, fueled by the instigations of consumerism and media yet linked also – or at times – to the building of subcultures as forms of resistance. Carnivalization, or ‘the return of the unpressed’ (Braun and Langman, 2011: x) is ludic and transgressive in spirit and involves first and foremost, embodied forms of pleasure, rule-breaking and enjoyment of socially prohibited desires. Carnivalization, at its best, offers channels for building meaning, identity, participation, agency and dignity for those who tend to be deprived of it, in the mindset and definitions of ‘normal society’.

Although, as a form of expression, carnivalesque practices remain, in Langman’s view, a poor and distracting substitute for more coherent and systematic social and ideological critique, they are nonetheless a part of our current cultural scenario and as such, must be understood and reckoned with. Thus, the concept of carnivalization may be seen as a fertile tool for rethinking the way we live in and through our bodies.

Finally, social constructionist and post-structuralist perspectives promote seemingly divergent positions on the fundamental ‘materiality’ or ‘discursivity’ of the body. While post-structuralists such as Judith Butler argue that a discursive focus in no way negates the ‘matter’ of bodies, ‘critical realists’ such as Simon Williams (2003) contend that we must distinguish ‘between ontological and epistemological levels’ HIV/AIDS embodiment, which means recognizing a difference between ‘metaphor and reality’, the materiality of the body and the discursive approach that we take in order to speak of it. Thus, rather than what Williams sees as a more conventional constructionist defense of the socio-cultural making of bodies which opposes the latter to biological materiality, he recommends a ‘weaker form of constructionism’ that allows us to ‘conceive of the biological in more “balanced” terms, not solely or simply as a constraint (important as this is) but also as an enabling set of powers and capacities … Biology … conceived in these more “open” terms, equips us for life in society, including the capacity for learning, sociality and control’ (2003: 6–7). He argues that a ‘sociological notion of the “body”’ therefore, viewed in these mindful, lived, experiential and expressive terms, involves three interrelated social processes of embodiment, en sellement and emplacement in time and space, which do indeed incorporate the biological in non-reductionist, non-dualist terms’ (Williams, 2003: 9). Feminist biologists would agree with Williams’ argument for dynamic, interconnected, historical and non-dichotomous ways of understanding the relationship between what we define as ‘biology’ and as ‘culture’. Birke and Vines (1987), for example, proposed new ways of understanding biology as ‘but a part’ of developmental processes. In an interesting twist in the process of dismantling binaries, current literature on the ‘sociology of animals’ (DeMelo, 2012; Peggs, 2012) encourages rethinking what makes humans similar to other animals, within a perspective that deals in ‘nature cultures’ rather than through the old opposition of *nature vs. culture*. Thus, benefitting from this new field of studies, we may argue that our equine or canine companions are also culturally constructed and embodied. Our interactions with them, held in high esteem today by urban and rural dwellers the planet over, may become so significant precisely because they are so overtly embodied, that is, relying heavily on senses which human interactions may easily ‘repress’ or relegate to a lesser status.

Theoretical framework to understand the field of medical sociology as structured around a neoliberal ideology of competition and marketization on the one hand and a counter-ideology of ethical globalization involving recognition of epistemological diversity on the other calls for a theoretical framework ethical agency that insists on recognition of difference which both encompasses existing power-structures, processes assisting their reproduction and For, Bourdieu’s sociology (e.g. Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, Bourdieu 1989, 1986, 1994, 1977, 1988), his concepts field, habitus, capital and symbolic violence, are there for drawn upon together with Levinas’ understanding of the ethical encounter as an encounter with the other as another who is not reduced to the same and the experience of that encounter as a trace of the other (e.g. Levinas 1996, Levinas 1986). Inter-epistemological encounters are identified:

1. Remaining other: the encounter as traces of the other’s knowledge
2. Becoming the same: the encounter as reduction and merger of epistemological positions
3. Rejecting the other: the encounter as reproduction of hegemonic epistemologies

The theoretical engagement with emotions and affectivity in the mid-1990s – what Patricia Clough has identified as an “affective turn” in the humanities and social sciences – draws on some of the most innovative and productive theoretical and epistemological trends of the two last decades of the twentieth century: psychoanalytically informed theories of subjectivity and subjection, theories of the body and embodiment, poststructuralist feminist theory, conversation of Lacanian psychoanalytic
theory with political theory and critical analysis, queer theorisation of melancholy and trauma. Threading through these fields of scholarly work, one easily attests to the high degree of interest in the ways in which discourses of the emotions emerge, circulate, are invoked, deployed and performed. It is in response to this special attention given nowadays to the cultural politics of emotions that Kathleen Woodward has aptly argued that we live in a cultural moment in which a new economy of emotions is emerging. Some of those theoretical trends draw on older genealogies of thought, from Baruch Spinoza to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Others joined important anthropological work in illustrating that emotions should not be regarded as pre-social, pre-ideological and pre-discursive psychological and individual states, but as social and cultural practices. Challenging the conventional oppositions between emotion and reason, and discourse and affect, these key trends of contemporary social and cultural theory have explored and reconfigured political and ethical (mis-)appropriations of emotions; the complex relation between power, subjectivity and emotion; the place of emotion, affect, sentiments and sentimentality within political and political theorising; the affective dimension of the normative; the affective as a condition of possibility for subjectivity; and the emotive and affective investment in social norms as a constitutive mode of subjectivation of HIV/AIDS embodiment drawing on such fields of reflection, which converse – either implicitly or explicitly – with the pervasive emotive predilections (mainly historical losses and traumas) of the twentieth century, the essays collected in this volume of History –– and reiterate past associations.

The essays bespeak a revaluation of the normative ‘power to act’ as the “power to feel”. It cannot be articulated through a slip of oversimplified positivity that Antonio Negri has defined affect merely as the “power to act”. The notion of affect bears the connotations of bodily intensity and dynamism that energise the forces of sociality. It cannot be thought outside the complexities, reconfigurations and inter-articulations of power. The semantic multiplicity of the notion of ‘affect’ emerges as particularly suggestive here: affect as social passion, as pathos, sympathy and empathy, as political suffering and trauma affected by the other, but also as unconditional and response-able openness to be affected by others – to be shaped by the contact with others. The topos of affect as social passion are the relation to the other taking place within power relations; perhaps, more accurately, the taking place of affect is the displacement from the passion/affect/trauma of the other. In the global affect economy of our times, this relation seems to waver politically between the cynicism of apathy and the bureaucratic banality of compassion and un affective sentimentalisation: indeed, an aporetic situation that echoes Lauren Berlant’s acute critique of the sentimental narrative, or sentimental liberalism, and her argument that injustice cannot be reduced to pain or feeling bad. The ambivalence residing at the heart of the notion of ‘passion’ becomes all too relevant in the Greek socio-historical context, where the concept of ‘passion’ has operated as a legitimising device for gendered violence. In her important work on ‘honour crimes’ in the post-Civil War Greece of the 1950s and 1960s, Efi Avdeli illustrates the normative disassociation of the ‘passionate’ code of male honour from violence, thus raising the questions: how are the semantic and discursive boundaries of (what matters as) violence regulated, and how is the symbolic and affective legitimacy of some forms of violence recognised and affirmed? In contexts of emotive governance, the critical issue is how ideas of individual and collective obligation to respond to suffering and violence are shaped by the historical, cultural, social and political specificity of regulatory norms and authority conventions. But how do we become ‘moved’ by affective discourses of pain, love, guilt or loss? How are subjectivities affected in these contexts of ‘moving’ towards or ‘turning’ away from objects and subjects, ideas and ideals, social and bodily spaces? How are specific bodies, lives and forms of life constructed as loveable, grievable and available to the normative culture of affective engagement, and how are others transformed into objects of hate and aversion? How does compassion become a way of remaining untouched by others, and thus turn into the sanitised, normative sentimentalisation of our humanitarian era? In such a spirit of questioning, Sara Ahmed has developed a groundbreaking theory of the cultural politics of emotion, one that interweaves emotions, language and bodies while attending to the intersections of gender, race, class, sexuality and nation. Navigating through histories of colonialism and racism, reconciliation and reparation, and debates on asylum and migration, Ahmed reflects on the significant role of emotion in feminist theory and politics, and, most importantly, theorises emotions as performative: they both generate their objects and reiterate past associations. The ambiguous performativity of emotions through the perspective of Western sensibility becomes particularly relevant in both historical and sociological accounts of cultural and political practices involving sentimentality, compassion, humanitarian help and philanthropic rhetoric. As Alexandra Bakalaki’s article in this volume exemplifies, contemporary philanthropic discourses and strategies are not merely fields wherein already constituted selves are played out, but rather become contexts within which subjectivities are socially constituted and performed; in the contemporary social drama of poverty relief, volunteerism and expertise, the authentic altruistic self is performed within discursive practices of care, support, guidance and empowerment. In the past, and here Costas Gaganakis’ account of Calvinist martyrs’ logic discourses is pertinent: people created their own way to salvation and managed to deal with vulnerability through various ‘strategies of self-inscription’, even in fiercely normative and disciplinary contexts of emotional management; poetic expression of the self as opposed to absorption into the ideological collective of the elect offers an alternative account of the French Wars of Religion and of the fate of the French Calvinist minority, beyond the Calvinist master narrative. Turning to a different historical context, to the complexities of contemporary European politics, Eleni Papagaroufali shows how the politics of emotion – especially in its configuration of normative and idealised familial ties – is mobilised and performed as a crucial
site of power in the context of postcolonial Europe’s “educational system of the heart”; affective, passionate and joyful rituals of identification, affiliation and belonging emerge as emotional and/or sentimental training technologies of the project of European integration. Various historical and cultural theorisations of subjecthood have emphasised the emotional underpinnings of power in multiple discursive contexts of vulnerability and injury. The historical shifts of “the language of fear” have emerged as an important field of inquiry in various historical works.8 Peter Stearns theorises fear as the central mode of self-expression and of making sense of the world in contemporary American politics. He invites us to think how and when fear became the dominant modern emotion and a key tool for manipulating public opinion and enforcing major decisions. Stearns traces the origins of a new socialisation pattern, in which fear had to be avoided rather than confronted and overcome in the second decade of the twentieth century, but he argues here that the new pattern only took hold fairly recently. Offering a reading (2008) of the September 11 Digital Archive, Despoina Valatou traces a process of sentimentalisation of public life which is connected with the desire to produce and consume personalised forms of historical knowledge; this digital repository of histories enacts the emergence of a new testimonial culture that derives from a physically detached, albeit sentimentally attached, subject. This emerging testimonial culture of personalised historical narrativity posits anew vexed questions of sentimental spectacularisation. Wendy Brown has importantly shown that there has been a fetishisation of the wound in subaltern politics, a situation that tends to turn all political claims into claims of injury, thus depoliticising the histories that have produced the wound and rendering action impossible. The commodification and spectacularisation of global victimhood has also been adequately illustrated by the important scholarly work conducted by social anthropologists of collective suffering. Indeed, the relationship between desire, power, bodies, subjectivity, materiality, trauma and alterity structures the theoretical work on which theorists of emotion draw inspiration and epistemological tools. What is epistemologically crucial to this ‘affective turn’ is the transition from paradigms of crude social constructivism to psychoanalytically informed and Foucault-inspired poststructuralist re appropriations of the discursive closure, such as those conducted in the context of theories of gender performativity and postcolonial studies. In such theoretical realms, the interest in the role of affectivity in historical, cultural, and political processes of identification and subjectivity was radically renewed, often within the context of an increasing awareness of the necessity to acknowledge the limits of constructivist accounts of identity and to suspend their ontological certainties and erasures. A suggestive symptom of this turn is the move from a strictly constructivist account of the body as a material substratum of ensuing social inscription to a more refined exploration of the ‘mattering’ of the body, whereby agency emerges as a dynamic force – at once cognitive, psychic, affective and sensual – of performative surprise. Beyond the emotion/cognition dichotomy: Historicising intimate sites of colonial and nationalist governance The master narrative in which an important volume of historical studies had its roots has been recently analysed and challenged. The grand narrative was based, according to Barbara Rosenwein, on a progressive paradigm of emotional self-restraint and assumed that the history of the West is the history of increasing emotional restraint. Studies that traced the genealogy of the emergence of “a European mentality of guilt” in early modern Europe ultimately rendered the grand narrative untenable, since the “civilising process” could no longer be tied to modernity. A different historical approach to emotions was introduced by historians who criticised the theoretical underpinnings of the old paradigm and took on board theories of emotions developed in anthropology and cultural theory, formulating new concepts for the study of the past. Rosenwein has introduced the term “emotional communities” and seeks to uncover systems of feeling that governed these communities. The endeavour focuses on styles of expressions, affective bonds people recognised, practices of various forms of sociability and sensibility that characterised each community but also the differences in the expression, shape and constraint of emotions within each community.14 Examining the “performance” of emotions becomes to understanding social life in history. Eleftheria Zei’s contribution here subscribes to the communicative function of emotions and adds an important dimension to the historical configuration of the cultivation of emotions through the management of mourning. The focus on the transformations and interactions of emotional articulations in the communities of the Aegean at the end of the seventeenth century shows the intertwining of intimate family constellations and high politics and their underlying power relationships. Historians, anthropologists and literary critics have analysed the ways in which the languages of class, gender and race have intersected with the politics of emotions in the social fabric of both the empire and the metropolis. More importantly, it is through this intersection that the analytical perspective on the relationship between empire and metropolis has been altered. The focus on the intimate as a strategic site of colonial governance illuminates the ways in which the relation between the public and the private has been fundamental to racialised imperial states. The female body symbolised the boundaries of empire within Victorian society: the myth of the savage woman was transposed to the metropolis and projected onto working-class women, shaping class and gender hierarchies in Victorian England. The bourgeois, if not of a different species, was at least a member of a superior race. Distinctions between passion and logic created a collapse of non-Europeans and women into an undifferentiated field. The empire and the metropolis became inextricably linked and dependent on each other through the interchangeability of images. The analytical framework shifted from the perception of the domestic as closed off and immune from the empire to the examination of the national framework through the empire. The ideological regulation and subjugation of the language of pathos is the focus of Jina Politi’s contribution. Politi examines the literary, historical and political circumstances in which the repression of the language of passions and sensibility took place in England in the late seventeenth century in the context of the rise of capitalism and colonial expansion. Passions became directly implicated in the field of politics, because at stake was the harnessing of violent passions, such as “enthusiasm”, which purportedly characterised the lower orders in English society during the seventeenth century. As manifested by the gradual replacement of the term “passion” by those of “emotion”, “sentiment” and “feeling”, the type of passionate man characterised specifically by a sublime, figurative language was thus superseded by a new type of human sociality, moral and civilised: “the man of feeling”. As much as imperialism cannot be adequately understood without a theory of power relations organised around the political and affective dynamics of gender and sexuality, nationalism too seems to be profoundly dependent on a politics of emotions. Michel Foucault’s biopolitics provides an analytic tool to understand how bodies and selves came to be a significant political concern of the state, and the ways in which people’s subjectivities were shaped as they operated inside the constraints set by imperial organisation. According to Alberto Mario
Banti’s article, nationalism derives its power from certain “deep images”, in which emotions, such as romantic love and the ethos of sacrifice, are centrally operative in organising and inculcating the nation as a system of kinship. The system of such morphological structures permits the imaging of nation as a community of descent and as a biological entity defined in terms of “race” and “blood”, which renders the nation as a community that has to be defended from miscategorization; in this context, the role of women is central to preserving the biological purity and continuity of the nation itself. Indeed, biopolitics emerges as a crucial feature in the making of the modern world both in domestic politics and in the empire. The nation as a community is solidified, imagined and imagined through the normativity of emotional bonds, and it is due to the emotional power derived from particular “deep images” that it acquires its performative force to reconfigure identities in the nineteenth century. The complex relationship between history and memory is mediated through emotions. “Memory,” as Dominick LaCapra argues, “... poses questions to history in that it points to problems that are still alive or invested with emotion and value.” In dealing with a past that has not passed away, history tests memory, while memory is important to history because of the centrality of trauma and the importance of traumatic events in the construction of HIV/AIDS identity.

The Social Space Initially, sociology presents itself as a social topology. Thus, the social world can be represented as a space (with several dimensions) constructed on the College de France, Paris Copyright O 1985 by Pierre Bourdieu basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active within the social universe in question, i.e., capable of conferring strength, power within that universe, on their holder. Agents and groups of agents are thus defined by their relative positions within that space. Each of them is assigned to a position or a precise class of neighboring positions (i.e., a particular region in this space) and one cannot really even if one can in thought - occupy two opposite regions of the space. In as much as the properties selected to construct this space are active properties, one can also describe it as a field of forces, i.e., as a set of objective power relations that impose themselves on all who enter the field and that are irreducible to the intentions of the individual agents or even to the direct interactions among the agents. The active properties that are selected as principles of construction of the social space are the different kinds of power or capital that are current in the different fields. Capital, which may exist in objectified form - in the form of material properties or in, the case of cultural capital, in the embodied state, and which may be legally guaranteed, represents a power over the field (at a given moment) and, more precisely, over the accumulated product of past labor (in particular over the set of instruments of production) and thereby over the mechanisms tending to ensure the production of a particular category of goods and so over a set of incomes and profits. The kinds of capital, like the aces in a game of cards, are powers that define the chances of profit in a given field (in fact, to each field or sub-field there corresponds a particular kind of capital, which is current, as a power or stake, in that game). For example, the volume of cultural capital (the same thing would be true, mutatis mutandis, of the economic game) determines the aggregate chances of profit in all the games in which cultural capital is effective, thereby helping to determine position in social space (to the extent that this is determined by success in the cultural field). The position of a given agent within the social space can thus be defined by the positions he occupies in the different fields, that is, in the distribution of the powers that are active within each of them. These are, principally, economic capital (in its different kinds), cultural capital and social capital, as well as symbolic capital, commonly called prestige, reputation, renown, etc., which is the form in which the different forms of capital are perceived and recognized as legitimate. One can thus construct a simplified model of the social field as a whole that makes it possible to conceptualize, for each agent, his or her position in all possible spaces of competition (it being understood that, while each field has its own logic and its own hierarchy, the hierarchy that prevails among the different kinds of capital and the statistical link between the different types of assets tends to impose its own logic on the other fields). The social field can be described as a multi-dimensional space of positions such that every actual position can be defined in terms of a multi-dimensional system of co-ordinates whose values correspond to the values of the different pertinent variables. Thus, agents are distributed within it, in the first dimension, according to the overall volume of the capital they possess and, in the second dimension, according to the composition of their capital - i.e., according to the relative weight of the different kinds of assets within their total assets. The form that is taken, at every moment, in each social field, by the set of distributions of the different kinds of capital (embodied or materialized), as instruments for the appropriation of the objectified product of accumulated social labor, defines the state of the power relations, institutionalized in long-lasting social statuses, socially recognized or legally guaranteed, between social agents objectively defined by their position in these relations; it determines the actual or potential powers within the different fields and the chances of access to the specific profits that they offer.” Knowledge of the position occupied in this space contains information as to the agents’ intrinsic properties (their Psychological condition) and their relational properties (their social position). This is seen particularly clearly in the case of the occupants of the intermediate or middle positions, who, in addition to the average or median values of their properties, owe a number of their most typical properties to the fact that they are situated between the two poles of the field, in the neutral point of the space, and that they are balanced between the two extreme positions. Classes on Paper On the basis of knowledge of the space of positions, one can separate out classes, in the logical sense of the word, i.e., sets of agents who occupy similar positions and who, being placed in similar conditions and subjected to similar conditionings, have every likelihood of having similar dispositions and interests and therefore of producing similar practices and adopting similar stances. This “class on paper” has the theoretical existence that is that of theories: insofar as it is the product of an explanatory classification, entirely similar to those of zoologists or botanists, it makes it possible to explain and predict the practices and properties of the things classified - including their group-forming practices. It is not really a class, an actual class, in the sense of a group, a group mobilized for struggle; at most, it might be called a probable class, inasmuch as it is a set of agents that will present fewer hindrances to efforts at mobilization than any other set of agents. Thus, contrary to the nominal’s relativism that cancels out social differences by reducing them to pure theoretical artifacts, one must therefore assert the existence of an objective space determining compatibilities and incompatibilities, proximities and distances. Contrary to the realism of the intelligible (or the reification of concepts), one must assert that the classes that can be separated out in social space (for example, for the purposes of the statistical analysis which is the only means of manifesting the structure of the social space) do not exist.
as real groups although they explain the probability of individuals constituting themselves as practical groups, in families (homogamy), clubs, associations, and even trade-union or political "movements." What does exist is a space of relationships that is as real as a geographical space, in which movements are paid for in work, in efforts and above all in time (moving up means raising oneself, climbing, and acquiring the marks, - - the stigmata, of this effort). Distances within it are also measured in time (time taken to rise or to convert capital, for example). And the probability of mobilization into organized movements, equipped with an apparatus and spokespersons, etc. (precisely what leads one to talk of a "class") will be in inverse ratio to distance in this space. While the probability of assembling a set of agents, really or nominally -through the power of the delegate -rises when they are closer in social space and belong to a more restricted and therefore more homogeneous constructed class, alliance between those who are closest is never necessary, inevitable (because the effects of immediate competition may act as a screen), and alliance between those most distant from each other is never impossible. Though there is more chance of one while ignoring the fundamental differences, particularly economic and national social space has its specific structure - e.g. as regards hierarchical distances within the economic field. Like "being," according to Aristotle, the social world can be uttered and constructed in different ways. It may be practically perceived, uttered, constructed, according to different principles of vision and division -for example, ethnic divisions. But groupings grounded in the structure of the space constructed in terms of capital distribution are more likely to be stable and durable, while other forms of grouping are always threatened by the splits and oppositions linked to distances in social space. To speak of a social space means that one cannot group just anyone with anyone while ignoring the fundamental differences, particularly economic and cultural ones. But this never entirely excludes the possibility of organizing agents in accordance with other principles of division ethnic or national ones, for example though it has to be remembered that these are generally linked to the fundamental principles, with ethnic groups themselves being at least roughly hierarchized in the social space, in the USA for example (through seniority in immigration). This marks a first break with the Marxist tradition. More often than not, Marxism either summarily identifies constructed class with real class (in other words, as Marx complained about Hegel, it confuses the things of logic with the things of logic); or, when it does make the distinction, with the opposition between "class-in-itself," defined in terms of a set of objective conditions, and "class-for-itself," based on subjective factors, it described the movement from one to the other (which is always celebrated as nothing less than an ontological promotion) in terms of a logic that is either totally deterministic or totally voluntarist. In the former case, the transition is seen as a logical, mechanical, or organic necessity (the transformation of the proletariat from class-in-itself to class-for-itself is presented as an inevitable effect of time, of the "maturing of the objective conditions"); in the latter case, it is seen as the effect of an "awakening of consciousness" conceived as a "taking cognizance" of theory, performed under the enlightened guidance of the Party. In all cases, there is no mention of the mysterious alchemy whereby a "group in struggle," a personalized collective, a historical agent assigning itself its own ends, arises from the objective economic conditions. A sleight of hand removes the most essential questions: First, the very question of the political, of the specific action of the agents who, in the name of a theoretical definition of the "class," assign to its members the goals official best matching their "objective" -i.e., theoretical -interests; and of the work whereby they manage to produce, if not the mobilized class, then belief in the existence of the class, which is the basis of the authority of its spokesmen. Secondly, the question of the relationship between the would-be scientific classifications produced by the social scientist (in the same way as a zoologist) and the classifications that the agents themselves constantly produce in their ordinary existence, and through which they seek to modify their position within the objective classifications or to modify the very principles that underlie these classifications. Perception of the Social World and Political Struggle the most resolutely objectivist theory has to integrate the agents' representation of the social world; more precisely, it must take account of the contribution that agents make towards constructing the view of the social world. Perception of the social world is the product of a double social structuration: on the "objective" side, it is socially structured because the properties attached to agents or institutions do not offer themselves independently to perception, but in combinations that are very unequally probable (and, just as animals with feathers are more likely to have wings than are animals with fur, so the possessors of a substantial cultural capital are more likely to be museum-goers than those who lack such capital); on the "subjective" side, it is structured because the schemes of perception and appreciation available for use at the moment in question, especially those that are deposited in language, are the product of previous symbolic struggles and express the state of the symbolic power relations, in a more or less transformed form. The objects of the social world can be perceived and uttered in different ways because, like objects in the natural world, they always include a degree of indeterminacy and fuzziness -owing to the fact, for example, that even the most constant combinations of properties are only founded on statistical connections between interchangeable features; and also because, as historical objects, they are subject to variations in time so that their meaning, insofar as it depends on the future, is itself in suspense, in waiting, dangling, and therefore relatively indeterminate. This element of play, of uncertainty, is what provides a basis for the plurality of world views, itself linked to the plurality of points of view, and to all the symbolic struggles for the power to produce and impose the legitimate world-view and, more precisely, to all the cognitive "filling-in" strategies that produce the meaning of the objects of the social world by going beyond the directly visible attributes by reference to the future or the past. This reference may be implicit and tacit, through what Husserl calls pretension and retention, practical forms of prospection or retrospection without a positing of the future and the past as such; or it may be explicit, as in political struggles, in which the past - with retrospective reconstruction of a past tailored to the needs of the present ("La Fayette, here we are") - and especially the future, with creative forecasting, are endlessly invoked, to determine, delimit, and define the always open meaning of the present. To point out that perception of the social world implies an act of construction in no way entails acceptance of an intellectualist theory of knowledge: the essential part of the experience of the social world and of the act of construction that it implies takes place in practice, below the level of explicit representation and verbal expression. More like a class unconscious than a "class consciousness" in the Marxist sense, the sense of the position occupied in social space (what Erving Goffman calls the "sense of one's place") is the practical mastery of the social structure as a whole that reveals itself through the sense of the position occupied within that structure. The categories of
perception of the social world are, as regards their most essential features, the product of the internalization, the incorporation, of the objective structures of social space. Consequently, they incline agents to accept the social world as it is, to take it for granted, rather than to rebel against it, to counterpoise to it different, even antagonistic, and possible. The sense of one's place, as a sense of what one can or cannot "permit oneself," implies a tacit acceptance of one's place, a sense of limits ("that's not for the likes of us," etc.), or, which amounts to the same thing, a sense of distances, to be marked and kept, respected or expected. And it does so all the more strongly where the conditions of existence are most rigorous and where the reality principle most rigorously asserts itself. (Hence the profound realism that generally characterizes the world view of the dominated, functioning as a sort of socially constituted instinct of conservatism, it can be seen as conservative only in terms of an external, and therefore normative, representation of the "objective interest" of those whom it helps to live, or survive.) If objective power relations tend to reproduce themselves in views of the social world that contribute to the permanence of these relations, this is therefore because the structuring principles of a world view are rooted in the objective structures of the social world: power relations are also present in people's minds, in the form of the categories of perception of these relations. However, the degree of indeterminacy and fuzziness in the objects of the social world, together with the practical, pre-reflexive and implicit nature of the schemes of perception and appreciation that are applied to them, is the Archimedean leverage point that is objectively offered for political action proper. Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par excellence, of political struggle, the inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for the power to conserve or transform the social word by conserving or transforming the categories through which it is perceived. The capacity to make entities exist in the explicit state, to publish, make public (i.e., render objectified, visible, and even official) what had not previously attained objective and collective existence and had therefore remained in the state of individual or serial existence - people's malaise, anxiety, disquiet, expectations - represents a formidable social power, the power to make groups by making the common sense, the explicit consensus, of the whole group. In fact, this work of categorization, i.e., of making-explicit and of classification, is performed incessantly, at every moment of ordinary existence, in the struggles in which agents clash over the meaning of the social world and of their position within it, the meaning of their social identity, through all the forms of benediction or malédiction, eulogy, praise, congratulations, compliments, or insults, reproaches, criticisms, accusations, slanders, etc.

III. FINAL REMARKS

Embodiment of HIV is a complex phenomenon in which many aspects (social, cultural, etc.), not only sociological, clinical and biological, are interrelated. Intervening factors in HIV phenomenon include social, economic, political, cultural and environmental aspects. The HIV phenomenon interacts with lifestyles and practices, as well as with the subjectivities of the sex offender in communities where it develops and spreads. Therefore, it is currently a fact that the epidemiological method is insufficient for providing holistic and hermeneutic knowledge on the issue. For this reason, a primary conclusion of this study is the need for applying other methodologies and theoretical tools to study the phenomenon with the aim of providing such knowledge. Furthermore, this knowledge is a key element for assuring efficient and effective HIV prevention policies and strategic planning for sex offender in particular and population in general. In this sense, sociology and in particular health sociology constitutes a pertinent conceptual and methodological tool for studying the marginalization and HIV phenomenon in all its complexity. In this sense, it seeks to explain and understand the collective behaviour that occurs in a social Space, the meanings of actions and the multi causality of phenomena. The theories that have previously been explained are relevant methodological and theoretical tools for comprehending the complexity that defines HIV. Though these instruments differ, they do have certain common characteristics that should be taken into consideration. A common premise is: conceiving human action in terms of its intentionality, autonomy and reflexivity.

And partly it is because the most marked objective differences may be masked by more immediately visible differences (e.g., those between ethnic groups). It is true that perceptual configurations, social Gestalten, exist objectively, and that the proximity of conditions, and therefore of dispositions, tends to be translated into durable linkages and groupings, immediately perceptible social units, such as socially distinct regions or neighborhoods (with spatial segregation), or sets of agents endowed with entirely similar visible properties, such as Weber's Stand. But the fact remains that socially known and recognized differences only exist for a subject capable not only of perceiving differences but of recognizing them as significant, interesting, i.e., only for a subject endowed with the capacity and inclination to make the distinctions that are regarded as significant in the social universe in question. Thus, particularly through properties and their distributions, the social world achieves, objectively, the status of a symbolic system, which, like the system of phonemes, is organized according to the logic of difference, differential deviation, thereby constituted as significant distinction. The social space, and the differences that "spontaneously" emerge within it, tends to function symbolically as a space of life-styles or as a set of Stand, of groups characterized by different life-styles. Distinction does not necessarily imply the pursuit of distinction, as is often supposed, following Veblen and his theory of conspicuous consumption. All consumption and, more generally, all practice, is "conspicuous," visible. whether or not it is performed in order to be seen; it is distinctive, whether or not it springs from the intention of being "conspicuous," standing out, of distinguishing oneself or behaving with distinction. As such, it inevitably functions as a distinctive sign and, when the difference is recognized, legitimate and approved, as a sign of 'distinction' (in all senses of the phrase). However, because social agents are capable of perceiving as significant distinctions the "spontaneous" distinctions that their categories of perception lead them to regard as pertinent, it follows that they are also capable of intentionally underscoring these spontaneous differences in life-style by what Weber calls "the stylization of life" (die Stilisierung des Lebens). The pursuit of distinction which may be expressed in ways of speaking or the refusal of misalliances produces separations intended to be perceived or, more precisely, known and recognized, as legitimate differences, which most often means differences in nature ("natural distinction"). Distinction -in the ordinary sense of the word -is the difference inscribed in the very structure of the social space when perceived through categories adapted to that structure; and the Weberian Stand, which is often contrasted with the Marxist class, is the class constructed by an adequate division of social space, when perceived through categories derived from the structure of that space. Symbolic capital -another
name for distinction -is nothing other than capital, in whatever form, when perceived by an agent endowed with categories of perception arising from the internalization (embodiment) of the structure of its distribution, i.e., when it is known and recognized as self-evident. Distinctions, as symbolic transfigurations of de facto differences, and, more generally, ranks, orders, grades, and all other symbolic hierarchies, are the product of the application of schemes of construction that, like (for example) the pairs of adjectives used to utter most social judgements, are the product of the internalization of the structures to which they are applied; and the most absolute recognition of legitimacy is nothing other than the apprehension of the everyday world as self-evident that results from the quasi-perfect coincidence of objective structures and embodied structures. It follows, among other things, that symbolic capital goes to symbolic capital, and that the -real - autonomy of the field of symbolic production does not prevent it being dominated, in its functioning, by the constraints that dominate the social field, so that objective power relations tend to reproduce themselves in symbolic power relations, in views of the social world that help to ensure the permanence of these power relations. In the struggle to impose the legitimate view of the social world, in which science itself is inevitably involved, agents yield a power proportionate to their symbolic capital, i.e., to the recognition they receive from a group. The authority that underlies the per formative efficacy of discourse about the social world, the symbolic strength of the views and forecasts aimed at imposing principles of vision and division of the social world, a being-known and being-recognized (this is the etymology of nobilis), which makes it possible to impose a precipice. Those most visible in terms of the prevailing categories of perception are those best placed to change the vision by changing the categories of perception. But also, on the whole, those least inclined to do so. The Symbolic Order and the Power to Nominate In the symbolic struggle over the production of common sense, or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate naming, that is to say, official -i.e., explicit and public -imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, agents engage the symbolic capital they have acquired in previous struggles, in particular, all the power they possess over the instituted taxonomies, inscribed in minds or in objectivity, such as qualifications. Thus, all the symbolic strategies through which agents seek to impose their vision of the divisions of the social world and their position within it, can be located between two extremes: the insult, an idioms logos with which an individual tries to impose his point of view while taking the risk of reciprocity, and official nomination, an act of symbolic imposition that has behind it all the strength of the collective, the consensus, the common sense, because it is performed by a delegated agent of the State, the holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence. On the one hand, there is the world of particular perspectives, singular agents who, from their individual viewpoint, their personal position, produce particular, self-interested naming, of themselves and others (nicknames, by-names, insults, even accusations, slanders), that lack the capacity to force recognition, and therefore to exert a symbolic effect, to the extent that their authors are less authorized and have a more direct interest in forcing recognition of the viewpoint they seek to impose. On the other hand, there is the authorized viewpoint of an agent authorized, in his personal capacity, such as a "major critic," a prestigious prefacer or a consecrated author (cf. Zola's "J'accuse"), and, above all, the legitimate viewpoint of the authorized spokesman of the mandated representative of the State, the "plane of all perspectives," in Leibniz's phrase - official nomination, the "entitlement" that, like the academic qualification, is valid on all markets and that, as an official definition of official identity, rescues its holders from the symbolic struggle of all against all, by uttering the authorized, universally recognized perspective on all social agents.

IV. REFERENCES


