Verification of Security Protocols Using ProVerif

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Abstract: With the rise of the proliferation of the Internet and other open networks in the day-to-day life, the use of the security protocols therein has also been on rise and so is the need for devising newer security protocols. The security protocols are meant to provide secure communication. Before being deployed, the security protocols are required to be thoroughly tested to gain confidence in the same. However, as is known from the basic principles of Software Engineering, exhaustive testing is virtually impossible.

1. Introduction

To secure Internet applications security protocols are developed. Security protocols are meant to provide secure communication. Communication channels may be exposed to attacks who may try to breach the security of the system by observing, modifying, delaying, redirecting or replaying the messages. So before being deployed, the security protocols are required to be verified. The formal verification of security protocols can state protocol is formally correct or not and thus free of errors such as inconsistency or ambiguity. For formal verification, we use ProVerif tool because it is a complete automated tool and can explore the complete state space of security protocols.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.1 Security Protocols

A security protocol is an abstract or concrete protocol that performs a security related function and applies cryptographic methods. Security protocols or cryptographic protocols are small distributed programs that ensure security properties in a hostile environment. Examples of properties that need to be ensured are secrecy and authentication [2].

2.2 Goals Of Security Protocols

A security protocol is designed to provide one or more security related services. These services can be confidentiality, authentication, integrity, access control and nonrepudiation.

2.3 Attacks On Security Protocols

The goal of an attacking a cryptosystem is to recover the key in use rather than simply to recover the plaintext of a single cipher text. There are two general approaches to attacking symmetric encryption scheme. One is cryptanalysis and other is brute force attack.

Other attacks are dictionary attacks, Denial of service attack [3], Virus, impersonation attack, release of message attack, traffic analysis, masquerade attack etc.
2.4 Formal Methods To Verify Security Protocols

Formal verification conducts exhaustive exploration of all possible behaviours. There are roughly two approaches to formal verification. These are theorem proving and model checking. Theorem Proving consists of using a formal version of mathematical reasoning about the system. Examples of theorem proving tools are HOL theorem prover, the ACL2 theorem prover, Isabelle theorem prover etc. Model checking consists of a systematically exhaustive exploration of the mathematical model.

3. RELATED WORK

Model checking tools have advantages over theorem proving tools. There are different model checking tools i.e. Casper/FDR[5], NRL, Athena[4], LySatool[6], ProVerif[7], Avispa(OFMC)[8]. Comparison of some model checking tools is given in following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool Name</th>
<th>Publicly available</th>
<th>Falsification</th>
<th>Verification</th>
<th>Termination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casper/FDR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRL</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athena(bounded)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athena(unbounded)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LySatool</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProVerif</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFMC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Implementation and Analysis

4.1 Andrew Secure RPC Protocol

Using out and in commands sender process and receiver process communicate with each other. Using encryption function sender or receiver can encrypt any message. This function takes two arguments. One is plain text message to be encrypted and other is key for encryption i.e. encrypt (M, Kab). Using decryption function sender or receiver can decrypt any message. This function takes two arguments. One is message to be decrypted and other is key for decryption i.e. decrypt (M, Kab). Using let command different values of messages are compared with stored values i.e. let (a, b) = decrypt (M, Kab). In this message M contains two values and first value is stored in variable a and other value is compared with b.

4.2. Kao Chow Authentication Protocol

In this protocol sender and receiver process is same as RPC protocol. This protocol uses server for authentication. Server Process binds host name with key using let command i.e. let Kas = getkey (a) in and then server sends message to other process.

4.3 An New Symmetric Key Distribution Protocol Using Centralized Approach

Functions for calculation are defined below. Inv function is used to inverse the number which is calculated by cal function.

```verbatim
def cal/1.
    def inv/1.
    equation inv(cal(x)) = x.
```
Sender Process and Receiver Process does same thing as previous protocols. Server Process binds host name with key using let command i.e. let Kas = getkey (a) in and then server sends message to other process. Here server process sends data to other processes simultaneously. This parallel execution of processes is done by | operator and this operator is placed between two processes i.e. out(C, M1) | out(C, M2).

4.4 An On Demand Key Establishment Protocol for MANETs

In our model, ProVerif uses following functions and equations for calculating and solving messages.

fun hash/1.
fun exp/2.
data g/0.
fun key/3.
equation exp(exp(g,y),z) = exp(exp(g,z),y).

ProVerif model for this protocol uses hash function for authentication. The function exp is used for exponential calculations. The function key is used to calculate final shared key. Sender and receiver process modelling is same as previous protocols.

4.5 An Authentication Protocol for Exchanging Encrypted Messages via an Authentication Server

This protocol is used for only authentication. Using out and in commands sender process and receiver process communicate with each other. Using encryption function sender or receiver can encrypt any message. This function takes two arguments. One is plain text message to be encrypted and other is publickey for encryptions i.e. encrypt (M, PubK). Using decryption function sender or receiver can decrypt any message. This function takes two arguments. One is message to be decrypted and other is privatekey for decryptions i.e. decrypt (M, PriK). Using let command different values of messages are compared with stored values i.e. let (a, =b) = decrypt(M, PriK). In this message M contains two values and first value is stored in variable a and other value is compared with b. Main process creates private public key pair for sender, receiver and server. The public keys of each of the components are distributed on public channels i.e. let publickey = pk (privatekey) in.

4.6 Tiny PK: Securing Sensor Networks with Public Key Technology

Sender and receiver process does encryption and decryption using functions. To calculate checksum of any message it uses checksum function. Declaration is given below.
fun checksum/1.

5. Modelling Attacks in ProVerif

ProVerif uses Dolev–Yao model of an attacker. The active attacker can eavesdrop or intercept any message sent over the network and send them to protocol participants.

5.1 Reply attack

ProVerif can send any message to any participants which are sent in the current session. In replay attack message stored in the previous session is sent to participants in current session. So we model replay attack by which a process send previously stored messages to the participants. When we consider Andrew Secure RPC Protocol, the last message contains session key and nonce. These values are newly generated by receiver. So if any attacker has...
these values from previous session then it can compromise the sender to use stale key. To implement replay attack one new process is added with sender and receiver.

let ProcessForReplayAttack =
  ! in(c,m);
  ! out(c,m).

We use correspondence assertion to prove Replay Attack. ProVerif implementation is shown below.

query ev:endA(x,y) ==> ev:beginA(x,y).
let processA =
  ....
  in(c,m4);
  let(kabnew,NB1)=decrypt(m4,kab) in
  event endA(kabnew,NB1);
  out(c,encrypt(SecretA,kabnew)).
let processB =
  ....
  new NbNew; new kabnew;
  event beginA(kabnew,NbNew);
  out(c,encrypt((kabnew,NbNew),kab)).

5.2. Denning Sacco Attack
This attack is somewhat same as replay attack. But in replay attack, attacker cannot impersonate the legitimate participants. In Denning Sacco attack, attacker can fool the legitimate participants, means here authentication property is compromised. We model this attack in Kao Chow Authentication protocol. To implement denning sacco attack one new process is added with sender and receiver.

let ProcessForDenningSaccoAttack =
  ! in(c, (m1,m2));
  ! in(c,(m3,m4,nb));
  ! out(c, encrypt(nb, kab)).

We use correspondence assertion to prove Denning Sacco Attack. ProVerif implementation is shown below.

query ev:endeventforattack(x,y) ==> ev:begineventforattack(x,y).
query evinj:endeventforattack(x,y) ==> evinj:begineventforattack(x,y).
let processA =
  ....
  if na = decrypt(m4, kab) then
  out (c, encrypt(nb, kab));
  event begineventforattack(Na, nb);
  ....
let processB =
  ....
  out (c, (m1,encrypt (na, kab ), nb ));
  in (c, (m5 ) );
  if nb = decrypt(m5, kab) then
  event endeventforattack(na, nb);
  ....
6. METRICS FOR EVALUATION

6.1 Time

Application running time is one of the important factors. To measure time taken by our ProVerif model we design function Calculate_time in Java. This function uses system time to calculate time taken to verify different properties of security protocols. Following Table gives rules generated by ProVerif and its total running time to verify all queries for the protocol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Protocol</th>
<th>Verification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Secure RPC Protocol</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Chow Authentication Protocol</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An New Symmetric Key Distribution Protocol</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An On Demand Key Establishment Protocol for MANETs</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TinyPK</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Authentication Protocol with an Authentication Server</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Verification Result

To validate our approach experimentally, we implemented a series of cryptographic protocols and verified their security against demanding threat models. Following figures summarize our results for these protocols.

Following table concerns verification: it gives the number of queries and the kinds of security properties they express. A secrecy query requires that a password or key be protected. An authentication query requires that message exchange be authentic. Some queries can be verified even in the presence of attackers that control some corrupted principals, thereby getting access to their keys and passwords. Not all queries hold for all protocols; in fact some queries are designed to test the boundaries of the attacker model and are meant to fail during verification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Protocol</th>
<th>Security Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Queries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Secure RPC Protocol</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kao Chow Authentication Protocol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An New Symmetric Key Protocol</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>On Demand Key Establishment Protocol</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TinyPK</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Authentication Protocol with an Authentication Server</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Conclusion

Applying formal methods to security protocols is an interesting, challenging, and current research area. There have been many significant verification tools for security protocols developed over the last twenty years. But much work needs to be done in the area of formal methods for specifying security properties, logics for reasoning about protocols. Security protocols used in different networks i.e. internet, wireless network, and mobile ad hoc networks are verified in this thesis. ProVerif is fully automated and efficient tool to verify security protocols. We verify security properties i.e. confidentiality, authentication in the
applied pi calculus using ProVerif tool. We model replay attack and denning sacco attack using ProVerif tool.

REFERENCES